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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEDUCfIBILITY OF DEPRECIATION IN YEAR. 
OF SALE WHERE SALE PRICE ExcEEDS ADJUSTED BASIS OF AssET-Plaintiff 
sold all the assets used in its business, in the middle of a fiscal year, at a 
price in excess of their depreciated cost at the beginning of the year. When 
plaintiff purchased the assets in question, it intended to use them until they 
became scrap. The assets were sold as part of a going concern years before 
plaintiff originally intended to dispose of them. A depreciation deduction 
claimed in the year of the sale was disallowed. An additional assessment was 
paid, a claim for refund was denied, and this suit was instituted. Held, 
judgment for plaintiff. Depreciation is deductible even though assets are 
sold during the taxable year at a price in excess of their depreciated cost 
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at the beginning of the year. S & A Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 677 
(D. Minn. 1963). 
Reasonable allowances for the exhaustion of property used in a trade or 
business or held for the production of income are permitted in the form of 
depreciation deductions.! The purpose of these allowances is to permit 
recovery of the cost or other basis of a depreciable asset by means of annual 
deductions during the useful life of the asset.2 The proper allowance is 
that amount which should be set aside each taxable year, in accordance 
with a reasonably consistent plan, so that the total set aside over the useful 
life of the asset will equal its cost or other basis less its salvage value.8 To 
determine depreciation deductions by use of the straight line method, it is 
necessary to estimate both useful life and salvage value. Prior to 1954, 
useful life referred to the physical life of an asset; today, it refers to the 
period during which an asset is expected to be useful to the taxpayer in 
his business.4 Estimated remaining useful life is subject to modification by 
reason of conditions known to exist at the end of a taxable year, but changes 
in useful life are not to be made unless there is a clear and convincing basis 
for redetermination.5 Salvage value is an estimate of the amount which will 
be realized upon disposition of an asset. It may be altered if useful life is 
redetermined, but it may not be altered merely to reflect changes in price 
levels.6 
In the principal case, the court refused to redetermine useful life and 
salvage value.7 However, such a redetermination was made in the similar case 
of Cohn v. United States.8 In both cases the assets in question were sold 
before their estimated useful lives in the taxpayers' businesses had expired. 
However, in the principal case the assets were sold as part of a going con-
cern, while in the Cohn case the sale took place as the business was about 
to terminate. In Cohn the court redetermined salvage value to equal the 
actual sales price of the assets. With this new salvage value, depreciation 
deductions in the year of the sale were not permitted because the depre-
ciated cost of the assets at the beginning of the year was less than their 
redetermined salvage value.9 In the principal case salvage value was not 
changed, and although depreciated cost at the beginning of the year was 
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a). 
2 Rev. Rul. 53-90, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 43. 
s Treas. Reg. § I.167(a)-l(a) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL 91. 
4 Treas. Reg. § I.167(a)-l(b) (1956), as amended, T .D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 91; 
see Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960); Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 
364 U.S. 92 (1960). 
Ii Treas. Reg. § I.167(a)-l(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 91. 
6 Treas. Reg. § I.167(a)-l(c) (1956), as amended, T .D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 91. 
7 218 F. Supp. 677, 682 (D. Minn. 1963). 
s 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958). This case arose under the Internal Revenue Code of 
1939, but it applies equally to the 1954 Code. Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL. 29, 30. 
9 Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-l(a) (1956), as amended, T .D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 91. 
Assets may not be depreciated below their salvage value under any method of computing 
depreciation. 
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below the sale price, deductions for depreciation were allowed because 
depreciated cost was still above the originally estimated salvage value. 
Since the principal case was decided by a district court in the Eighth 
Circuit, it could not overrule the Cohn decision, which was rendered by the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. However, the principal case does 
seem to indicate that the Cohn ruling should not apply to cases in which 
assets are sold as part of a going concern. The importance of deductibility 
of depreciation in the year of sale makes this limitation on Cohn highly 
significant. Total gain before taxes is the same whether or not a deduction 
is' allowed, but if the deduction is allowed, a greater part of the gain will 
come under section 12311° and be taxed at the lower capital gains rate. It 
should be noted, however, that under section 1245,11 which the Revenue 
A<:t of 1962 added to the Code, the tax on gains from the disposition of 
"section f 245 property"12 sold in a taxable year beginning after December 
31', 1962, is the same whether or not a depreciation deduction is permitted 
in .the year of sale. Despite the addition of this section to the Code, deduc-
tibility of depreciation in the year of sale is still of vital importance in 
many instances. Although there is a considerable degree of overlap between 
depreciable property and "section 1245 property," the overlap is not com-
plet~.13 For example, buildings and their structural components are not 
"section 1245 property." In addition, deductibilty of depreciation in the 
year of sale is still significant with respect to present cases arising out of 
sales in a taxable year beginning prior to December 31, 1962. As a result, 
despite the addition of section 1245, detailed examination of the reasoning 
and conclusions of both Cohn and the principal case seems warranted. 
Some of the conclusions reached by the courts in these two cases appear 
to be of doubtful validity. In the principal case, both estimated useful life 
and salvage value should have been changed. The Government contended 
that the decisions in Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States14 and Hertz Corp. 
'= · 10 Gains from compulsory or involuntary conversions, sales, or exchanges of property 
used in the trade or business are taxed as gains from the sale or exchange of capital 
assets held for more than six months. INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 1231. 
11 If § 1245 property is disposed of during a taxable year beginning after December 
31, 1962, the amount by which the adjusted basis of the property is less than the lower 
of (1) the amount realized in the case of a sale, exhange or involuntary conversion, or 
the fair market value in the case of any other type of disposition or (2) the recomputed 
basis of the property, is taxable as ordinary income. The term "recomputed basis" refers 
to the adjusted basis of the property plus deductions from the adjusted basis for 
depreciation and amortization attributable to periods after December 31, 1961. INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 1245(a). 
12 Section 1245 property is any property, other than livestock, which is or has been 
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in § 167 and is either personal prop• 
erty or other property (not including a building or its structural components), but only if 
such other property is tangible and has an adjusted basis which reflects deductions for 
depreciation or amortization. INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 1245{a)(3). 
13 See Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1483, 1497-1502 (1963). 
14 364 U.S. 92 (1960). 
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v. United States15 required a redetermination.16 The court properly rejected 
this contention by pointing out that those cases were distinguishable on 
the facts. In both Massey and Hertz the taxpayers had at the outset 
improperly determined the useful life of each of the assets in question by 
estimating physical useful life rather than useful life in the taxpayer's 
business. This was done despite the fact that estimated useful life in the 
business was much shorter than estimated physical useful life because the 
assets were purchased with an intent to dispose of them before they became 
scrap. An improper determination of this sort was not possible in the 
principal case because, at the time of acquisition, the taxpayer intended to 
retain the assets until they became scrap. As a result, in the principal case, 
anticipated useful life in the taxpayer's business and anticipated physical 
useful life were identical. However, the court also concluded that the 
plaintiff did not come within the letter or spirit of section l.167(a)-l(b) of 
the Treasury Regulations.17 This conclusion seems erroneous. Section 
l.167(a)-l(b) provides: 
"[E]stimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life 
inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may 
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or 
business. . . • The estimated remaining useful life may be subject to 
modification by reason of conditions known to exist at the end of the 
taxable year and shall be redetermined only when the change in the 
useful life is significant and there is a clear and convincing basis for 
redetermination.''18 
Plaintiff's estimates of useful life were reasonable as originally determined, 
but at the end of the taxable year in which the sale took place plaintiff 
knew the exact life, with relation to its business, of each of its assets and 
knew that its original estimates had been highly inaccurate. As a result, the 
estimated useful life of each of plaintiff's assets should have been redeter-
mined.' This redetermination would have been quite significant because a 
shortening of useful life would have necessitated a change in salvage value. 
Concerning the redetermination of salvage value, however, the method 
adopted by the Cohn decision was not sound. The court in that case was 
justified in making a redetermination, but the method employed was 
improper. By adjusting salvage value to equal sales price,19 and by permit-
ting deductions in the year of sale only to the extent that the depreciated 
basis of an asset at the beginning of the year exceeded its sales price, the 
court in Cohn denied the possibility of a capital gain unless the depreciated 
us 364 U.S. 122 (1960). 
10 218 F. Supp. 677, 681 (D. Minn. 1963). 
17 Id. at 682. 
18 Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-l(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 Culll. BuLL. 91. 
(Emphasis added.) 
19 See Motorlease Corp. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 356, 362-63 (D. Conn. 1963), for 
what appears to be an erroneous interpretation of the holding in the Cohn case, with 
respect to redetermination of salvage value. 
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basis of an asset at the beginning of the year of the sale was below its sales 
price. Such a decision seems contrary to the spirit of section 1231 of the 
1954 Code2° and section l.167(a)-8(a)(l) of the Treasury Regulations,21 
both of which allow capital gains treatment of income resulting from the 
disposition of depreciable assets. A redetermination which equates sal-
vage value with sale price does not completely eliminate the possibility of 
a capital gain: deductions in years prior to the sale will not be disallowed 
even if it becomes apparent that they reduced the basis of the asset below 
the price at which it was sold.22 However, in cases in which the depreciated 
cost of the asset at the beginning of the year of sale exceeds the sales price, 
a capital gain is not possible; and in cases in which the sale price exceeds 
depreciated cost, the difference between basis and sale price may not be 
increased in the year of sale. In effect, a redetermination which equates 
salvage value and sale price prevents any reduction in basis in the year 
of sale which would give rise to a capital gain or increase a capital gain 
already caused by depreciation deductions of previous years. It seems 
illogical to argue that Congress intended to limit the capital gains treat-
ment of depreciable assets in this way.23 
In conclusion, it seems that the same rules of law ought to have been 
operative in both Cohn and the principal case. In both instances, the dis-
position took place before the end of the assets' useful lives as originally 
estimated. Therefore, in both cases, each asset's estimated useful life should 
have been redetermined to conform to its known life in the taxpayer's 
business. It seems quite irrelevant that in one of the cases the assets were 
disposed of as part of a going concern, and in the other the sale took place 
as the business was about to terminate. With respect to salvage value, the 
facts in each of the cases should have been considered, and redeterminations 
should have been made to correct for that part of the difference between 
the initial estimated salvage value and the sale price which was due to 
error in estimation rather than appreciation in value. This should have 
been done by reverting to the time of acquisition and making new esti-
mates of salvage value, taking into consideration all facts known at ac-
quisition, the now known physical condition of each asset at the time of dis-
position, and the now apparent useful life of each asset. In making these 
new estimates, the market at the date of acquisition should have been 
consulted, but appreciation in value between acquisition and sale should 
have been ignored. In the principal case, the assets in question were sold 
years before the plaintiff had originally intended to sell them. In all prob-
ability, the difference between sale price and estimated salvage value was 
20 !NT. RE\'. CODE OF 1954, § 1231. 
21 Where an asset is retired by a sale at arm's length, recognition of gain or loss 
will be subject to the provisions of §§ 1002, 1031, 1231, and other applicable provisions of 
law. Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-8(a)(l) (1956). 
22 See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.47 (1960). 
28 This limitation is quite different from that imposed by § 1245 and is seemingly 
foreclosed by § 1231. 
1964] RECENT DECISIONS 913 
almost completely due to the fact that the plaintiff was selling relatively 
new assets after having estimated salvage value on the assumption that the 
assets would be disposed of in the form of scrap. As a result, the difference 
between estimated salvage value and sales price was primarily due to error 
in estimation; thus salvage value should have been redetermined to approxi-
mate sales price. On the other hand, in the Cohn case the assets in question 
were sold near the end of their estimated lives, and a significant part of the 
difference between the price they brought and their salvage value was due 
to appreciation in value as a result of rising wartime prices.24 This being 
the case, salvage value probably should have been redetermined, but not 
to equal or even approximate sale price. In this way, capital gains treat-
ment would be afforded only for true appreciations, because depreciation 
deductions would be allowed in the year of sale only to the extent that 
they reduced basis to the properly redetermined salvage value. 
Paul A. Rothman 
24' See Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1958). 
